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COVID-19 Antibody Test/Vaccination
Certification: There’s an App for That
Marc Eisenstadt , Manoharan Ramachandran, Niaz Chowdhury, Allan Third, and John Domingue
Abstract—Goal: As the Coronavirus Pandemic of
2019/2020 unfolds, a COVID-19 ‘Immunity Passport’ has
been mooted as a way to enable individuals to return back
to work. While the quality of antibody testing, the avail-
ability of vaccines, and the likelihood of even attaining
COVID-19 immunity continue to be researched, we address
the issues involved in providing tamper-proof and privacy-
preserving certification for test results and vaccinations.
Methods: We developed a prototype mobile phone app and
requisite decentralized server architecture that facilitates
instant verification of tamper-proof test results. Personally
identifiable information is only stored at the user’s discre-
tion, and the app allows the end-user selectively to present
only the specific test result with no other personal infor-
mation revealed. The architecture, designed for scalability,
relies upon (a) the 2019 World Wide Web Consortium stan-
dard called ‘Verifiable Credentials’, (b) Tim Berners-Lee’s
decentralized personal data platform ‘Solid’, and (c) a Con-
sortium Ethereum-based blockchain. Results: Our mobile
phone app and decentralized server architecture enable
the mixture of verifiability and privacy in a manner derived
from public/private key pairs and digital signatures, gen-
eralized to avoid restrictive ownership of sensitive digital
keys and/or data. Benchmark performance tests show it to
scale linearly in the worst case, as significant processing is
done locally on each app. For the test certificate Holder,
Issuer (e.g. healthcare staff, pharmacy) and Verifier (e.g.
employer), it is ‘just another app’ which takes only minutes
to use. Conclusions: The app and decentralized server ar-
chitecture offer a prototype proof of concept that is readily
scalable, applicable generically, and in effect ‘waiting in the
wings’ for the biological issues, plus key ethical issues
raised in the discussion section, to be resolved.
Index Terms—Blockchain, COVID-19, coronavirus, de-
centralized, immunity certification.
Impact Statement—As soon as COVID-19 antibody test-
ing, vaccines, and likelihood of immunity surpass quality
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thresholds, our tamper-proof and privacy-preserving certi-
fication can be rapidly deployed. Our approach is applica-
ble to any certification scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Coronavirus/COVID-19 pandemic of 2019/2020 isstill taking its terrible toll as we write this [1]. Tests for
the presence of antibodies could offer a way for people who can
prove COVID-19 immunity to go back to work [2], [3]. There
are, however, challenges concerning the biological premise of
‘immunity’: the strength and longevity of COVID-19 immunity
after infection are matters of current debate and research, as are
the sensitivity and robustness of the relevant tests [4], [5] and
the race to develop a viable vaccine [6], [7].
Given the scale of the pandemic and financial fallout, it is
plausible that ‘COVID-19 antibody test / vaccination certifica-
tion’ (henceforth ‘CAT/VC’), if shown to be robust, will be in
great demand. Bearing in mind the legal and ethical implications
of such certification, raised in [8], [9] and our Discussion, we
feel that for either the current pandemic or a pandemic of the
future, the concept of certification has a place, particularly
when the recipient is employed in healthcare or other key
sectors.
But what form should certification take? A signed or stamped
letter is the centuries-old default, and straightforward to roll out
at scale, as long as there is some point-of-test proof of identity.
Our approach is based on the view that for such a sensitive and
likely high-value certificate, a paper version is too vulnerable
to alteration or forgery (an exception arises in environments
that are ‘lower tech’ for socio-economic reasons and we later
describe a printed certificate to address this case). A digital
certificate makes the most sense, provided that it can be: (i)
Privacy-preserving (because as proud as the holder might be of
new-found ‘immunity’, personal data can be re-purposed in un-
predictable ways [10]), (ii) un-forgeable, (iii) easy to administer,
(iv) easily verifiable while still preserving privacy, (v) scalable
to millions of users, and (vi) cost-effective.
All of this effort would be wasted without public acceptance,
which is increasingly challenging in an era of suspicion about
data-collecting apps [11]. Toward this end, we argue not only
for the decentralized approach underlying our design and imple-
mentation below, but also for its benefits in allowing individuals
who have been tested to change their minds and quit the scheme,
knowing that even cryptographically encoded data will be ‘or-
phaned’ (no data pointing to it), rendering it meaningless. Also,
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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in the Supplementary Materials, we emphasize the importance
of having strong oversight by an ethics watchdog to ensure best
endeavours to avoid unleashing a Pandora’s Box of undesirable
side-effects.
How best to undertake such a challenge? Modern smart-
phone apps and several key technologies such as public key
cryptosystems and immutable blockchain records offer some
tantalizing prospects for the path we envisage, if they can satisfy
the above criteria. Below, we look at the methods by which this
can be achieved, assuming a scenario involving testing by a
known authority (e.g. a healthcare practitioner or pharmacist),
as opposed to self-testing at home. This main paper assumes an
‘On-Site Test for Antibodies + Issuance of Digital Certificate
Including Photo ID’ in order to explain our approach, and
in the Supplementary Materials we describe variations for (a)
‘Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo ID’, (b) ‘Issuing Paper
Certificate’, (c) ‘Off-Site Testing Via External Lab’, and (d)
‘Vaccination + Certification’
II. METHODS
We focus on the design and implementation of a prototype mo-
bile phone app and requisite decentralized server architecture,
intended to facilitate verification of tamper-proof test results.
Our design involves a novel hybrid architecture based on (a)
the 2019 World Wide Web Consortium standard called ‘Verifi-
able Credentials’, (b) Tim Berners-Lee’s decentralized personal
data platform ‘Solid’, and (c) a Consortium Ethereum-based
blockchain. We work through (d) a plausible use case scenario,
then (e) describe the key ‘onboarding’ and certification steps
in detail; and (f) provide benchmark tests to anticipate scaling
performance.
A. ‘Verifiable Credentials’ For Digital Certification
Verifiable Credentials [12] is a W3C standard that builds
upon Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the public/private key
pairs that facilitate digital signatures in widespread use today.
The W3C extensions standardize the definitions of document
formats to make them machine-readable and communicable,
and to generalize PKI, which tends to be costly and highly
centralized. The generalization involves a decentralized registry
for cryptographic keys, typically residing in a blockchain — this
allows every public key to have its own unique address, known as
a Decentralized Identifier (DID). The key roles and transactions,
adapted for our specific use case, are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The ‘Issuer’, in our case a trusted pharmacy or the UK Na-
tional Health Service (NHS), can issue credentials such as blood
test results and vaccination certificates. ‘Holders’ (typically
citizen end-users) can store them in their own preferred way,
for example in digital wallets that are part of a mobile phone
app. ‘Verifiers’, such as employers, or establishments seeking
proof of some attribute, can ask the Holder to present such
proof concerning these credentials. Verifiers also check digital
signatures against what is known as a ‘verifiable (decentralized)
data registry’: this is the blockchain where the DIDs mentioned
above reside.
Fig. 1. Main roles and workflow in W3C Verifiable Credentials [12],
adapted for our COVID-19 Antibody Testing use case.
B. ‘Solid’: Decentralized Personal Data
We pointed out in [13] that the over-centralization of data,
particularly its consolidation into ‘silos’ by brand-name IT
services and social network providers, is of increasing concern.
Decentralization is an ideal starting point for storing sensitive
data, including medical, financial, and other personal data — but
only if security and privacy are significantly better than what can
be offered by traditional centralized systems.
We identified a promising approach to widespread deploy-
ment, known as Solid, initiated by Sir Tim Berners-Lee [14],
[15]. Solid aims to decentralize the Web by transferring control
of data from a central authority to users, thereby allowing users
to retain complete ownership of their data, which they store in
what are called ‘Solid Pods’ — analogous to a personal web
server that is hosted either locally on a mobile phone, or hosted
with a cloud provider of the individual’s choice, or both. The
key distinction from centralized approaches is that even in the
provider-hosted case, the provider’s access to the data is limited
by the user’s preferences.
In [16] we proposed an approach combining Solid Pods
and distributed ledgers, of the type familiar to the blockchain
community, to facilitate the complete decentralization of data.
The key ingredients of this combination are illustrated in Fig. 2,
which also provides an overview of the main test/certify/verify
life cycle. Our methods give users total control over their data
while maintaining the integrity of the stored information through
blockchain-based verification.
As in Fig. 1, the ‘Holder’ is the primary individual who is self-
motivated to obtain the certificate of COVID-19 antibody test
results in order to be admitted to a workplace or other location.
Holders own, manage, and control their own Solid Pods (shown
as hexagons in the Holder’s mobile phone in Fig. 2 at A, E, and
F), which contain their personal data. In Fig. 2, our Holder’s
Solid Pod contains a elements of a physical ID such as a driving
license (‘thumbprint’ icon at A) and the Holder’s signed and
countersigned certificate of COVID-19 antibody test results —
represented in Fig. 2 as a document in which is embedded a
special QR code (F). The Holder is free to store the Solid Pod data
on his/her mobile phone, on a personal favorite cloud provider, or
both (we only show the mobile phone version for simplicity). At
any time, Holders can move or delete data, as it remains under
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Fig. 2. Steps in testing, certification, and verification, showing a Solid
Pod (hexagon) hosted on the Holder’s mobile phone (labels A, E, F), with
minimal hash storage for verification. The circles at B depict replicated
blockchain nodes on multiple servers, receding into the distance.
their ownership. One-way encoded ‘hashes’ of the data (only
a few bytes in size) are held, as shown by the dashed arrows
in Fig. 2 (E and H), on a blockchain to support independent
verification.
C. Consortium Blockchain
In our design, we use a ‘Consortium blockchain’, shown in
Fig. 2(B) as circles (depicting multiple replicated blockchain
nodes receding into the distance): this is not a fully public
blockchain like Ethereum or Bitcoin, but rather a blockchain
shared specifically by a Consortium of known providers
who have signed up to the Ethics Guidelines we describe
in the Discussion Section. The Open University-led Consor-
tium blockchain is a private Ethereum network known as
OpenEthereum (formerly Parity Ethereum) [17], [18] which
uses a ‘Proof of Authority’ consensus mechanism [19] wherein
several nodes can be in the mutually-agreed privileged position
of being allowed to confirm transactions. As we go to press,
our Consortium blockchain comprises nodes run by The Open
University, BT, Condatis, Inrupt, and the Chiba Institute of
Technology near Tokyo, with expansion planned as our pro-
totype implementation is scaled up via other large-company
partnerships now under discussion. This approach contrasts
with that of Bitcoin and other early blockchains which use
the slow and ecologically unfriendly Proof of Work, wherein
massive computing power enables nodes to have a better chance
of confirming transactions. The Consortium approach gives us
the kind of distributed scalability that increases security, but
without the widespread public availability that may serve as a
disincentive for individuals to participate.
D. Use Case Scenario
In our scenario, the Issuer (Pharmacy) needs to authenticate
that the Holder is who they say they are, and thus requests that
the Holder display (a) a physical ID, such as a Driving License
or a Passport, and (b) a QR code which is scanned by the Issuer
using the Issuer’s mobile phone app, both of which are shown
in Fig. 2 (C). At this point the Issuer taps to accept the ID, and
the Holder’s photo is ‘burned’ into the upcoming steps so that
at the final step of verification there will be no need to display
the same physical ID. The next steps are as follows:
2) The blood test is performed, and the certificate with results
is issued as soon as the results are available (off-site lab
tests are dealt with in the Supplementary Materials). The
Issuer (first scanning a printed QR code if preferred)
generates a digitally-signed test result as a new QR code
(labelled D in Fig. 2) for transmission to the Holder,
thereby providing a Verifiable Credential which is dig-
itally signed by both the Issuer and the Holder, and stored
on the Holder’s Solid Pod (Fig. 2, D and E). At label E we
also see that a hash of the Verifiable Credential is stored
on the Consortium blockchain to facilitate verification at
step 3.
3) The Holder can now present a provably valid certificate
to the Verifier. To avoid someone else impersonating the
Holder, the Holder’s ID photo was already ‘burned’ into
the digital certificate at Step 1, so the Holder needs to
present only the QR code (F and G in Fig. 2)
At H in Fig. 2 we see that the Verifier’s app automatically
verifies both digital signatures and the certificate against the hash
stored on the Consortium blockchain, and confirms acceptance
of the COVID-19 Antibody Test Certificate. The certificate
stores quantitative test results, such as antibody type (e.g. ‘IgG’)
and level, so it is up to the Verifier’s own contextually guided
procedures to decide whether to admit the Holder, for example,
to work.
E. Primary design (Onboarding and Certification)
Below we separately describe the details for (i) ‘Onboarding’
for Issuers, Holders and Verifiers, and (ii) how Certification
works behind the scenes. The companion step of (iii) Verification
is conceptually similar, and thus provided separately in the
Supplementary Materials, as are the more straightforward de-
scriptions of the server and mobile app functional architectures.
1) Onboarding: There are three entities involved in the op-
erations: Issuers, Holders and Verifiers. The onboarding process
lets all of them install and configure the app. The configura-
tion process for each of them is distinct and requires specific
documentation.
Issuers: The onboarding of a potential Issuer (Fig. 3) begins
with the person downloading and installing the app. The app
then instructs the Issuer to complete an in-app form. Because
the Issuer has the ability to test, validate and issue certificates
to individuals, the app employs two factor authentication for
all potential Issuers. We anticipate using the API provided
by the General Pharmaceutical Council, or an equivalent, to
cross-check the registration and the branch information of the
likely Issuer (this is simulated in our prototype — discussions
about API access are underway), followed by email verification.
The former requires the person to input appropriate information
into the form, while the latter asks the potential Issuer to provide
a valid official email address at the company’s registered domain
name. The app sends a special link to that Issuer’s email address
to complete the registration. Data provided by the potential
Issuers resides on each Issuer’s Solid Pod.
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Fig. 3. Issuer onboarding timeline details.
Fig. 4. Holder onboarding timeline details.
Fig. 5. Verifier onboarding timeline details.
Holders: The process of onboarding a Holder (Fig. 4) in-
volves adding an identification document such as a driving
license or passport. The document number is used to generate the
Decentralized ID (DID) that acts as the anchor for the Holder. A
potential Holder first downloads and installs the app followed by
adding a photo of the identification document. This document
resides in the Holder’s Solid Pod. This photo document is
deemed permanent (but remains on their personal Solid Pod) and
once submitted, cannot be changed again. The app then provides
the Holder with the DID, leaving the owner of the account ready
for testing and certification.
Verifiers: Of the three main roles, the process of onboarding
Verifiers is the most straightforward. Anyone willing to act as
a Verifier can download the app and start verifying. There is no
need to create an account for verifying a Holder’s certificate. As
the Verifier submits no data, the steps of the Verifier onboarding
timeline (Fig. 5) do not involve Solid Pods.
2) Certification: The certification process requires a Holder
to visit an Issuer with the exact document used for identification
at the time of onboarding. At this point the Issuer matches
this document with the copy stored in the Holder’s Solid Pod,
viewing it on the app and tapping to accept the ID. The Holder’s
photo is ‘burned’ into the upcoming steps so that at the final
step of verification, there will be no need to display the same
physical ID. In Fig. 6, we see the ‘behind the scenes’ view of
certification, including the Holder’s Solid Pod with the ID.
The app is designed to work in a completely decentralized
environment. Its functionalities run across the Issuer’s, Holder’s,
and Verifier’s phones as well as on the hosting servers, but does
not have access to any data from a central database. Every
time the app needs to execute an operation, it reads the data
from a particular user’s Solid Pod (and only with the user’s
permission). In Fig. 6, at (A) we see that the app reads the allowed
identity details from the Holder’s Solid Pod, and at (B) compares
their hash with the corresponding hash on the blockchain and
confirms this on the Issuer’s phone display.
Once the identity is confirmed, via physical document checks
and Verifiable Credentials demonstrating ownership of the rel-
evant DIDs, the Issuer conducts the antibody test and initiates
the process of generating a certificate at (C). A certificate is a set
of data in W3C RDF (Resource Description Framework) format
[20] containing the test results and a Verifiable Credential for
the just-tested Holder. While the hash of the certificate goes onto
the blockchain at (D), the original document resides in the Solid
Pod (E). It is notable that neither the blockchain nor a third-party
centralized server stores the personal data of the Holder.
The Holder has the option of keeping a copy of the certificate
in a cloud server of his or her choice. In the event of losing
the phone, the Holder can retrieve the data from the cloud and
restore the certificate in the regenerated local Solid Pod of the
replacement phone. This certificate is visible on the Holder’s
app in the form of a QR code, giving an easy-to-scan option for
Verifiers.
3) Verification: The innards of Verification are conceptually
similar to what we have just shown for Certification and are thus
provided separately in the Supplementary Materials.
F. Benchmark Testing
To anticipate scalability, we benchmarked three operations
(Issuing, Verifying, and Uploading) against a baseline ping that
simply echoed a response following a request.
For both Issuing and Verifying we used two variants, to assess
the difference between generating hashes (a) locally within the
mobile phone app and (b) externally on a server before adding
to the blockchain. The Uploading times are purely the times for
uploading a certificate to a Solid Pod stored in the cloud, in case
that is the Holder’s preference.
III. RESULTS
A. COVID-19 Antibody Test Certification:
App Characteristics
Our ‘COVID-19 antibody test certification’ (CAT/VC) app
builds upon the Verifiable Credentials and Solid frameworks
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Fig. 6. Certification: main dataflows.
described in Section II, plus our own expertise developed over
the past 5 years in the area of blockchain-based certification [21],
[22]. The result combines the following characteristics:
 Wholly resident on the end-user’s smartphone, yet usable
as a paper-only certificate in appropriate socio-economic
contexts, as described in the Supplementary Materials.
 One-tap scan, display, and verification of antibody test
results, which are owned by the user.
 The app only reveals verifiable CAT/VC results without
revealing any personally sensitive information, at the dis-
cretion of the user.
 The details of Verifiable Credentials, Solid Pods, and
Ethereum blockchain are hidden: from the user’s point
of view, it is ‘just another app’.
B. Performance Benchmarking Results
Fig. 7 shows the time to completion in seconds (Y axis) of all
six operations where we sent between 1 and 100 simultaneous
requests (X axis): the fastest (baseline) ping is the lowest line.
Uploading is the second least expensive operation, while Veri-
fying and Issuing are the two most expensive operations of our
app. The relative difference in time between operations involving
locally generated hash (LH) and server-generated hash (SH) is
modest for Issuing (6.9% difference between ‘Issuing SH’ and
‘Issuing LH’), but more twice that for Verifying (17.1% differ-
ence between ‘Verifying SH and ‘Verifying LH’). This behavior
is understandable, as Issuing requires writing on the blockchain
through transactions (i.e. the method that allows adding an entry
to the distributed ledger) while Verifying involves only a look
up at a particular ledger entry.
Linear growth for all operations indicates that our architec-
ture is capable of handling scale-up without surprise: there is
simply no inter-node or inter-app communication or interaction
overhead, so by improving the configuration of the common
infrastructures in the architecture, such as any Solid cloud server,
blockchain node, or any other intermediate element, the archi-
tecture can serve more parallel requests, i.e. reduce the response
time. Implications and additional results are discussed below
and in the Supplementary Materials.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Deployment, Integration, and Scale
Our focus is on trusted certification, and for this reason we re-
main committed to deployments involving nationally approved
locations such as pharmacies or UK National Health Service
surgeries rather than home testing (off-site lab tests are described
in the Supplementary Materials). With our approach, deploying
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Fig. 7. Time to issue up to 100 parallel requests for ‘Issuing’ (SH=Server Hash and LH=Local Hash), ‘Verifying’ (SH=Server Hash and LH=Local
Hash) and Uploading of Solid Pod data vs baseline standard ‘Ping’.
the decentralized servers requires another dozen or so Consor-
tium members in addition to the five already engaged, plus about
two days of training, which can be handled in parallel for all
Consortium members via webinars, as we already do in our
current work with blockchain-based educational certification
[23]. The mobile phone app itself requires just a download
and less than 30 minutes of training for Issuers, and even less
for Verifiers and Holders—we anticipate developing a video
tutorial for all scenarios. More significantly is the ‘buy-in’ i.e.
acceptance by certified pharmacies and, in the UK, the National
Health Service, and integration with existing work practice,
ethics guideline approval, and agreement about what, if any,
data needs to be stored centrally (no central storage is required
at all by our approach). For a full-scale rollout, it would be
necessary to further stress-test our prototype along the lines we
have already started as described in the preceding Sections.
The technology itself is inherently scalable as our Results sec-
tion shows: transactions on the Consortium blockchain typically
take under 5 seconds to be confirmed after entry by the Issuer,
after which other steps such as verification are subjectively
instantaneous. This scales well, as the architecture is inherently
distributed across servers (blockchain nodes) and mobile phone
apps. Moreover, we have shown worst case results, covering
the case when (a) all Solid servers are hosted on the same
machine, (b) all blockchain transactions are being sent to the
same specific node, and (c) all users are acting simultaneously.
In the best case scenario, all simultaneous users would connect
to their own Solid servers, and any simultaneous blockchain
transactions would each involve different blockchain nodes, so
performance overhead would be constant for each additional
user. Realistically, i.e. in between these cases, there would be
ample numbers of Solid servers, many dozens to hundreds of
blockchain nodes, and natural spacing between transactions, and
thus performance overhead for each additional user would be
minimal.
Collaborative possibilities for rollout and integration are
promising, as new initiatives in this niche are rapidly emerging
[24].
B. Beyond Antibody Test Certification
Our scenario highlights antibody testing, but the technology
is identical for vaccination certification, as we describe in the
Supplementary Materials — this may prove even more popu-
lar once vaccines have been suitably tested and approved [6],
[7]. The app and decentralized server architecture are readily
scalable and applicable generically. For example,
 People could demonstrate that they are eligible to use
different methods of transport or to visit public places such
as libraries, theaters, or holiday destinations.
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 Utility/building/repair staff seeking access to a place of
residence, even in ‘normal’ healthy times, could ‘prove
their roles’.
 More generally, the entire area of ‘Decentralized Verifiable
Personal Health Records’, as described in [25], partic-
ularly if augmented by the W3C Verifiable Credentials
standard [12], can benefit from the approach described
herein.
C. Ethics
New technologies bring new challenges for society. Com-
mentators have argued (e.g. in [8], [9], [26]), that certification
of the type we have envisaged, even when totally private and
tamper-proof, would entail multiple risks, notably: (a) disen-
franchising the poor and others who do not have access to the
technology or the tests, or have access but ‘fail’ the test, and (b)
becoming a stepping-stone for future governments to deploy the
same concept either to enable or to enforce discrimination based
on immunity and other arbitrary conditions. To avoid this tech-
nology becoming ‘weaponized’ for discriminatory purposes, we
advocate several measures including optional rather than manda-
tory use, adherence with UK NHS Information Governance
guidelines [27], [28] and oversight by an Ethics Committee.
This issue is analyzed in detail in the Supplementary Materials.
V. CONCLUSION
The perceived need for a COVID-19 Antibody Test / Vac-
cination Certificate, if shown to be biologically robust and to
conform to proposed ethical guidelines, has motivated us to
develop a mobile phone app based around Verifiable Creden-
tials, distributed storage of cryptographic public/key pairs, and
the decentralized verification of data with confidentiality. This
has enabled us to provide a facility that is ‘just another app’
from the viewpoint of the end-user, healthcare professionals,
employers and other relevant authorities — thereby providing
a tamper-proof record owned entirely by the end-user, and
allowing the end-user selectively to reveal solely the proof of
test results without surrendering other personal information (e.g.
age, address, blood type, other discovered antibodies or immune
deficiencies or other inadvertent revelations in the data set, for
which certificate Holders may have no idea how this information
might be used by someone else in the future), and requiring only
mobile phone app downloads from everyone in the loop. This
app and its secure digital certificate thus become a powerful ad-
junct/enhancement to traditional paper-based certification from
the NHS or Pharmaceutical testing authorities — and without
the need for the costly installation of special ‘e-ticket reader’
hardware: the same mobile phone app is sufficient for the task
at hand, regardless of which of the three roles is involved. Many
other uses of secure and private certification via mobile phone
app and decentralized servers are additionally made possible,
and our infrastructure can be embedded into any other app or
web portal through APIs.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N this supplementary materials section we provide the 
following extras: Introduction — more about the premise of 
immunity; Methods — (a) how we achieve robust privacy, 
(b) more details about how Verification works and the 
functional architecture and mobile phone app infrastructure, 
(c) scenario variations for (i) Issuing a Digital Certificate 
Without Photo ID, (ii) Issuing a Paper Certificate, (iii) Off-
Site Testing Via an External Lab, and (iv) Vaccination + 
Certification; Results — additional aspects of system 
performance; Discussion — further observations about rollout 
and ethical issues.  
The premise of immunity: Throughout most of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
has advocated a ‘test-isolate-trace’ approach [1]. In parallel, 
there has been a worldwide cooperative effort to develop a 
vaccine [2] and to develop numerous serological tests for the 
presence of antibodies [3]. If immunity is strongly implied by 
the outcomes of these latter tests, then individuals could be 
allowed to get back to work, particularly in healthcare and 
other key areas [4], [5]. The WHO initially warned that the 
very premise of COVID-19 immunity was itself uncertain [6]. 
Yet the fast pace of research is already showing promising 
signs that early testing was flawed, the presence of antibodies 
in recovered individuals has been confirmed, and re-infection 
now seems increasingly unlikely [7], [8]. True, some 
immunologists have argued that COVID-19 immunity could 
be very weak, because ‘reinfection is an issue with the four 
seasonal coronaviruses that cause about 10% to 30% of 
common colds’ [9]. But others in that same discussion argue 
that immunity could be valid for ‘a year or two’, a view shared 
by Male, who with Golding and Bootman has written a clear 
exposition on the life-cycle of infection, antibody detection, 
and likely immunity to COVID-19 [10]. A related challenge is 
the quality of the testing: test sensitivity (% positive detection 
for the right antibodies, so high sensitivity means few false 
positives) and specificity (% negatives correctly detected, so 
high specificity means few false negatives) are undergoing 
great scrutiny even as we write this [11], and are naturally a 
matter of concern, because they must be sufficiently high to 
make the approach worthwhile.  In the meantime, our research 
aims to find an approach to achieve highly robust certification, 
so that it is ready to deploy as-and-when the ongoing 
biological research satisfies the necessary quality criteria. 
II. METHODS 
A. The design of robust privacy 
Several important guidelines concerning privacy were set 
out by the Sovrin Foundation, a nonprofit organisation with 
over 70 corporate partners including IBM, Cisco and others, 
which has the aim of ‘driving greater interoperability and a 
new trust model for securely sharing private information’ [12]. 
We adopt a variation of the three principles set out in the 
Sovrin.org White Paper [13], modifying their item 2 as shown 
below. 
1) Pairwise-unique DIDs and public keys 
As Sovrin.org explains, ‘Imagine that when you open a new 
account with an online merchant, instead of giving them a 
credit card number or phone number, you gave them a DID 
created just for them. They could still use this DID to contact 
you about your order, or to charge you a monthly 
subscription, but not for anything else. If […] your DID were 
compromised in any way, you would just cancel it and give 
them a new one—without affecting any other relationship. 
[consequently…] a pairwise-pseudonymous DID is not worth 
stealing.’ [13] 
2) Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / User’s Choice 
According to [13], no private data should be stored on the 
ledger, even in hashed form, to make it future-attack-proof. 
Sovrin accepts, as do we, the need for pseudonymous 
identifiers (DIDs), pseudonymous public keys, and agent 
addresses (e.g. the mobile phone app endpoints) to be stored in 
a decentralized ledger, but in addition we offer the user a 
choice regarding whether and where to host personal 
information (mobile phone, favorite cloud provider, or both), 
plus the barest minimum for verification purposes, namely 
hashes (irreversible encodings) of private data. This has the 
following benefits:  
• Serves as a user-storage ‘vault’ for later recovery in 
case of loss.  
• This ‘vault’ (i.e. the Solid Pod) can reside on the user’s 
phone, or on a favorite cloud provider, or both — it is 
always the user’s choice. 
• To facilitate later independent verification, it uses a 
blockchain with distributed nodes run by a Consortium 
of trusted providers so that there is neither a single 
point of failure nor a single ‘owner’ even of the hash of 
the certificate. 
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• Even so, it only stores a hash on the Consortium 
blockchain — a non-reversible but provably correct 
encoding of the certificate rather than the certificate 
itself.  
This is a powerful privacy-preserving and tamper-proof 
approach that we call Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / 
User’s Choice. Verborgh [14] has a deeper discussion of the 
nature and importance of these types of emerging paradigm 
shifts. 
3) Selective disclosure  
It is essential that users (certificate Holders) should only 
have to reveal just the portions of their own personally-held 
private data that are relevant to specific transactions (e.g. 
proving that you are 18 years of age or older, in order to make 
certain purchases or access certain locations, but without 
revealing your actual age or date of birth). This is made 
possible by the technology known as cryptographic zero 
knowledge proofs [15–17], so named because they provide, to 
the Verifier who wishes to know, proof of something specific 
(such as ‘Age ≥ 18’), but with the Verifier having no 
knowledge of any other details, in this case actual age or date 
of birth. The ‘secret sauce’ of zero knowledge proofs, as 
illustrated in [16], [17], is that a mathematical function works 
through a proof of some fact (such as age being greater than or 
equal to X, or the existence of a certain credential), in such a 
way that the actual steps involved in executing the proof only 
reach a positive outcome if the fact is true (for example, the 
positive outcome may require a certain number of steps to 
execute): so the proof is valid, but still only indirect (e.g. 
counting the steps executed) without touching the raw data 
[15], [16]. 
B. Verification and implementation details 
This section describes the operations that underpin the 
functioning of verification, as well as the overall 
implementation infrastructure and mobile phone app. 
1) Verification 
The process of verifying a certificate is an on-demand 
action. A Verifier cannot validate a certificate unless 
requested. It requires a Holder to go to a Verifier for this 
purpose. A Verifier can be an employer or other individual or 
organisation to whom the Holder wants or needs to present the 
certificate. Fig. S1 shows the main data flows involved in 
Verification. 
In Fig. S1, we see that once requested, at (A), the app reads 
the QR code from the Holder’s phone. This QR code (which is 
generated from the data that itself is stored in the Solid Pod) 
has two components: the certificate and a URL pointing to the 
hash on the blockchain. At (B), the app extracts these 
components and at (C) locally generates a temporary hash of 
the certificate. Finally (D), the app fetches the hash stored on 
the blockchain and compares it with the local hash. The 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S1. Verification: main dataflows. 
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matching of the hashes indicates the validity and the 
authenticity of the certificate stored in the Solid Pod of the 
Holder. At the same time, the physical identity of the Holder 
can be confirmed by the Verifier via the Holder’s photo ID 
which will already have been ‘burned’ into the mobile phone 
app certificate. The digital identity of the Holder can be 
confirmed by verifying the Verifiable Credential (embedded in 
the certificate) based on the relevant Holder DID. 
 
2) The functional infrastructure 
The components of our implementation communicate with 
each other via current Web standards — Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS), RDF (primarily in the JSON-LD 
format), Verifiable Credentials, and Decentralized Identifiers 
— and via blockchain protocols (specifically, Ethereum 
protocols). The volumes of data and computational 
requirements are typically small and can be handled by a 
mobile device (full blockchain nodes are an exception, due to 
the potential size of the full chain data). 
The main software functions required by the 
implementation are as follows: 
 
Generate QR codes: Implemented using standard 
libraries to generate QR codes for identity and 
immunity certificates.  
Generate hashes: Using standard libraries, 
certificates are transformed into a canonical RDF 
format before hashing, in order to ensure robust 
reproducibility of hashes, for verification.  
Communicate with Blockchain: The Parity library is 
used to communicate with our Consortium 
blockchain. A light client library can handle 
read/write interactions with the blockchain without 
requiring a phone to maintain a full copy of the 
blockchain. 
Communicate with Solid Pods: Communication with 
Solid takes place using the Solid REST API [18], to 
read and write personal data regarding the Holder to 
and from their Solid Pod with user permission.  
Manage Issuer and Holder Credentials: Issuer and 
Holder credentials are stored in public/private key 
wallets containing DIDs. The authorization for an 
Issuer to create certificates can be represented as a 
Verifiable Credential issued by the relevant 
regulatory authority to the Issuer, which any 
participating party can verify. Currently we use 
Streetcred ID [19] to generate DIDs for the Issuers, 
Holders and Certificates.  
Generate Verifiable Credentials: Certificates are 
created at issue time, and their contents asserted as 
the Claim elements in Verifiable Credentials to be 
stored in the Holder’s Solid Pod, with metadata 
describing the relevant blockchain records forming 
the Proof. This provides a sharable data structure 
which permits anyone to check its authenticity. 
 
 
 
Fig. S2. Representative screen shots of the running mobile app showing (A) home screen, (B) multiple routes for login for the three main roles, just about to 
tap on ‘Issuer’, (C) about to issue the certificate having already scanned the user’s ID number, displayed at the top, (D) certificate QR code, ready to be 
scanned by the Holder’s mobile phone app. 
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3) The mobile phone app 
Fig. S2 shows representative screen shots of the mobile 
phone app, which provides all the necessary UI elements for 
the Issuer, Holder and Verifier to perform their actions. At the 
time of writing, the main functionalities of the mobile phone 
app include the ability to scan and generate QR codes and 
generate hashes for text and images. For the QR code scan and 
generate functions to work, the mobile phone app is packed 
with necessary libraries to support QR code functions and only 
works on smartphones with built-in camera functionality. The 
mobile phone app also contains the hashing libraries. As the 
mobile phone app needs to communicate with a server, an 
active internet connection is necessary for HTTPS server calls.  
For speed of implementation for the current prototype, a 
Node.js Express server does all the heavy lifting for the app, 
with the functionalities explained above. This is a temporary 
solution, however, given the urgency of the current situation. 
C. Scenario variations 
Throughout the paper we have focused on a scenario 
involving ‘On-Site Test for Antibodies + Issuance of Digital 
Certificate Including Photo ID’, but there are some key 
variations easily incorporated into our design, namely (i) 
‘Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo ID’, (ii) ‘Issuing 
Paper Certificate’, (iii) ‘Off-Site Testing Via External Lab’, 
and (iv) ‘Vaccination + Certification’, described in turn below. 
1) Variation 1: Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo ID 
In our scenario in the main paper, Fig. 2, the Issuer 
(Pharmacy) needs to authenticate that the Holder is who they 
say they are, and thus requests that the Holder display both a 
physical ID, such as a Driving License or a Passport and also a 
QR code which is scanned by the Issuer using the Issuer’s 
mobile phone app.  At this point there is in fact a choice: the 
Issuer can either (a) tap to accept the ID, in which case the 
Holder’s photo will be ‘burned’ into the upcoming steps so 
that at the final step of verification, there will be no need to 
display the same physical ID, or (b) leave the Holder to 
display the physical ID once again at verification time. 
If path (b) is chosen, there are other implications. At 
Verification time, to avoid someone else impersonating the 
Holder, the Holder must present not only the certificate, but 
also some proof of identity. In this variation, the Verifier can 
confirm the identity of the Holder by visually inspecting a 
physical ID card, and separately scanning the Holder’s 
presented QR code (without ID incorporated) to verify just the 
certificate.  
 
2) Variation 2: Issuing Paper Certificate 
At step 2 of our main scenario, the test certificate can in fact 
be provided purely on paper, which has a dual purpose for the 
Holder: (a) a fallback in case of mobile phone failure; (b) a 
‘tech-agnostic’ option which enables us to provide 
certification in a more appropriate manner for cases of socio-
economic deprivation. This alternative means that some of the 
advantage of digital certification will be missing, but the use 
of printed QR codes which include the image of the Holder are 
still a useful advance over plain paper certificates. It also 
provides an alternative for individuals with little access to 
technology, but for whom a paper-based QR code printout can 
serve as a ‘good enough’ and ‘effectively tamper-proof’ 
certificate.  
 
3) Variation 3: Off-Site Testing Via External Lab 
It is likely that in many cases, particularly where large 
volume or high-quality serology testing is required, the 
Holder’s blood sample has to be sent to a separate lab for 
processing. In this variation, the Pharmacist can issue a 
certificate that is flagged as being in a ‘pending’ state. The lab 
technician will also have a login to the app, via an additional 
button on the login screen, and see the list of pending 
certificates waiting for processing and approval. Once the lab 
technician has the results for a blood sample, the technician 
has to scan the QR code attached to the sample (this 
incorporates the Holder’s digital ID, but with no personal 
information exposed to the lab technician) and then tap a 
button to issue the certified results to the relevant Holder. At 
this point, the Holder receives a notification with details of the 
certified result. 
Note that the steps in this variation are just like the steps in 
‘supply chain provenance’ gaining increasing traction in the 
blockchain ‘farm-to-fork’ world, typified by the IBM Food 
Trust [20]. Such efforts are also gaining ground in the area of 
vaccine supply chain provenance [21].  At each step of the 
chain, each participant adds the information pertinent to their 
niche, and digitally signs, while cross-checking automatically 
for authenticity of provenance at earlier steps in the supply 
chain.  For blood samples, both the issuer and lab technician 
would add serial numbers and details for the blood sample and 
containers, syringes as necessary, and respective registration 
numbers / IDs for their roles as pharmacist and lab technician.  
At Verifier stage, and even for the lab test manufacturer, 
similar procedures would be deployed so that the integrity of 
the whole testing life cycle was ensured. 
 
4) Variation 4: Vaccination + Certification 
Although the most forward-looking variation (because 
vaccine research, development, approval, and deployment may 
take the longest [2]), it fits very smoothly into our existing 
scenario life cycles.  Essentially, the Issuer as described 
throughout the main section of the paper becomes the person 
administering the vaccination jab (as opposed to taking a 
blood sample), and certifying that this has happened in the 
same manner described for the antibody test certificate.  The 
approach to ‘supply chain provenance’ discussed in the 
preceding paragraph also applies to this variation, because the 
Issuer will have to include details of the vaccination source 
and batch within the certificate. 
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III. RESULTS 
Fig. S3 shows the number of operations per second 
(Ops/sec) for Issuing, Verifying, Uploading, and Pinging, 
calculated from the slope of the 1-100 parallel operations 
timing described in the main paper.  It demonstrates that while 
the current configuration is constant, our architecture can 
serve about five certificate issuances per second. For 
verifications, although we experimented with both local and 
server variants, in practice the hash will be generated locally 
(within the mobile phone app), giving us the ability to verify 
about six certificates per second with the existing 
infrastructure. 
This observation shows us that the operations of Issuing and 
Verifying are twice as expensive as the simplest server ping. 
Except for some common infrastructure, the architecture is 
decentralized, i.e. one issuer issues (or verifier verifies) one 
certificate using one smartphone at a time even if we have 
hundreds of thousands of parallel requests. Even some 
commonly held infrastructure can be more distributed, such as 
the Solid pods. In this experiment, we used just one Solid 
cloud server for all requests, but in practice, users will have 
their Solid pod hosted on multiple servers or their own mobile 
phone. Therefore, if only those common and fixed 
infrastructures are scaled up, or load-balancing is applied to 
divert requests over multiple machines, performance time will 
significantly improve, with a concomitant speedup of Issuing 
and Verification not requiring architectural re-design. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. More about rollout 
The architecture presented in the main paper and 
Supplementary Material above is all built on standard library 
modules, and therefore joining a Consortium blockchain to 
help roll this out at scale is relatively straightforward, subject 
to suitable testing and deployment. The key hurdles are 
primarily Issuer credentials and the critical mass of the 
Consortium blockchain. In the case of Issuer credentials, we 
mentioned in section II.E.1 about Onboarding that we use two 
factor authentication for Issuers, and an API provided by the 
General Pharmaceutical Council to cross-check registration — 
this of course is subject to approval, and relevant discussions 
are already underway.  As for the Consortium blockchain, a 
strong Consortium of industrial and academic partners needs 
to be established, after which addition of new members is just 
a matter of approval by the existing Consortium and the 
distribution of training and instruction materials. 
Alternatively, ‘parallel’ consortia can be created by cloning 
our approach. Given related ongoing work [22] that we 
mentioned in the main paper, we are optimistic that critical 
mass can be achieved. 
B.  Ethical considerations 
It should be clear from the previous sections that the 
concepts underlying Verifiable Credentials and the 
Decentralized Verification of Data with Confidentiality are 
diametrically opposed to any kind of central data storage or 
‘Big Brother’-style snooping and data collection, and indeed 
provide excellent and agreed standards for avoiding such 
snooping and data collection. To be clear, in the approach we 
advocate in this paper,   
Personally identifiable information is stored entirely under 
the Holder’s control (on a mobile phone, on the Holder’s 
cloud provider of choice, or both), and additionally for 
later verification purposes in minimal (a few bytes) 
encoded form (hash) on a Consortium blockchain. 
Moreover, the app allows the user selectively to present 
only the specific test result, with no other personal 
information revealed. 
 
How is it possible that no personal information is stored in a 
database? What about the certificate itself? That’s the beauty 
of Verifiable Credentials, Zero Knowledge Proofs and our 
approach of Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / User’s 
Choice: taken together, this combined approach offers 
cryptographically signed, verifiable, un-tamperable proof that 
the certificate being shown was really granted by a known 
testing authority to the person in question, even without 
showing the name, address, phone number or even UK NHS 
number of the person holding it.  
Everything in this app is decentralized. Anyone wishing to 
abandon involvement in this kind of certification can just 
delete the Verifiable Credentials stored on their Solid Pods. 
There will be no records whatsoever, as if they had never been 
on the system. Deleting data on the Solid Pods will also turn 
the hashes on the blockchain into ‘orphans’ (no data pointing 
to the hash), i.e. the hashes will become meaningless: it is not 
possible to recover the original data from a hash. 
This almost-too-good-to-be-true approach does raise a fresh 
concern, raised briefly in the main paper: the same techniques 
we are advocating seem to open up what we call the ‘Private 
Verifiable Credentials Paradox’: your digital mobile phone 
app certificate is so much more private and tamper-proof than 
the old paper or database versions that it could (deliberately or 
accidentally), be weaponized for discrimination against your 
fellow citizens. In other words, a potential problem, according 
 
Fig. S3. Operations per second for Issuing (Server vs Local hashing), 
Verifying’ (Server vs Local hashing), Uploading and (baseline) ‘Pinging’. 
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to critics, is not that the architecture is too weak, but that it is 
too strong. 
Clearly, the more powerful methods of today and tomorrow 
have the potential to open up a Pandora's Box of Bad Use, if 
not by the modern democracies in which we may have grown 
up, then by some authority in another time or place - as the 
world has witnessed all too tragically in the past.  We started 
this project with the noble aim of facilitating a way to get 
people back to work and heading towards recovery from the 
devastating impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic of 
2019/2020. If COVID-19 antibodies can indeed be shown 
reliably to confer immunity, and the overwhelming support for 
the ‘test-test-test’ mantra of the World Health Organization 
continues to hold, then people are going to get tested, in 
overwhelming numbers, and certificates are going to be issued 
in one form or another. 
But we are not adopting a ‘give-up-and-accept-our-fate-in-
the-hands-of-bad-actors’ approach. Yes, a secure digital 
certificate could hypothetically be weaponized to a greater 
degree than a paper one, but the actual degree could be 
something of a mind-set illusion. Any certification method has 
such potential, and therefore, rather than casting the 
technology in terms of ‘good vs evil’ we think our approach is 
best considered as something that involves a trade-off between 
(a) the advantages of getting people back to work using good 
privacy-preserving fraud-prevention methods and (b) the 
disadvantages of discriminatory (mis)use of such methods.  
Our approach to this trade-off is strongly to nudge things 
towards (a), and therefore we propose the following concrete 
steps to achieve this: 
• App usage should be strictly opt-in/optional: a paper 
certificate must always be allowed by default, just as 
with, say, train or airline tickets. This helps introduce 
the concept and technology in a gentle manner: people 
will ultimately decide what they prefer for themselves. 
• Implementations must comply with UK NHS 
Information Governance (IG) guidelines [23], [24]. 
Compliance should in principle be straightforward, 
because (a) in our approach, personally identifiable 
information is stored entirely under the Holder’s 
control, and additionally for later verification purposes 
in minimal hash-encoded form on a Consortium 
blockchain, and (b) the app allows the user selectively 
to present only the specific test result, with no other 
personal information revealed. Even so, the UK NHS 
IG documents provide a strong guiding framework for 
ensuring continuing compliance, particularly with 
respect to relevant EU GDPR requirements such as 
‘Right to erasure’ and ‘Right to data portability’: our 
architecture by its very design avoids database storage 
of personally identifiable information, but oversight of 
possible misuse/abuse of this and related technologies 
needs to be maintained, as the next three bullet points 
suggest. 
• COVID-19 Antibody Test Certificates should only be 
applied to workers in healthcare and other comparable 
key sectors, as defined by the appropriate UK 
Parliamentary process (for example, the list of key 
exceptions to mandatory business closure during the 
current pandemic was specified by the UK Ministry of 
Housing, Communities, and Local Government), with 
input from an Ethics Committee mentioned next. 
• An Ethics Committee, comparable in scope and 
composition to the UK NHS Research Ethics 
Committees, should have oversight of actual 
deployment of the approach advocated herein. 
• The approach should be reviewed on a 3-monthly basis.  
 
In a timely and thoughtful analysis of the ethical 
complexities surrounding COVID-19 antibody test 
certificates, Persad and Emanuel [25] argue convincingly for 
the label ‘immunity-based licenses’ (rather than ‘immunity 
passports’) as a way to focus on the positive benefits granted 
to those who have been infected with COVID-19, without 
necessarily worsening the lives of those who have not been 
infected. 
Ethical standards are challenging to uphold, but uphold 
them we must: we see a strong emphasis on ethics as the best 
way to negotiate a path towards a ‘pandemic end game’ in a 
manner acceptable to the widest possible audience. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Will such an app be suitable as part of a ‘pandemic exit 
strategy’ for helping get people back to work in key sectors? 
There are many issues to be addressed first, including the 
rigorous scrutiny and approval of antibody tests, likelihood 
and longevity of immunity, agreement concerning ethical 
oversight, and acceptance by the public. Our approach is 
intended to ensure that the procedures for creating tamper-
proof, verifiable, privacy-preserving certificates are ‘ready to 
go’ while waiting for antibody/immunity tests to achieve the 
required state of robustness and acceptance. We believe that, 
just as with train e-tickets, end-users will ‘vote with their feet’ 
and deploy the app in large numbers once its benefits have 
been demonstrated. To take a stance against what we call the 
‘Pandora’s Box of Bad Use’, we proposed ethical guidelines at 
the end of the Discussion, which we believe are essential for 
the principled development and deployment of the prototype 
described in this paper. 
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